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Abstract: In this paper we present a Kaleckian model which discusses the conditions leading to 
an external crisis in a small open developing economy fully integrated to the international goods 
and financial markets. We discuss how the key variables of a Kaleckian macrodynamic model, 
and particularly the external debt to GDP ratio, evolve when both purchasing power parity and 
uncovered interest rate parity apply. The government may choose between two kinds of policies, 
an inflation rate target or a real exchange rate target. The paper discusses how these alternative 
policies affect the possibility of a Minskyan endogenous transition from hedge to Ponzi finance 
in the external debt.  
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Resumo: Neste artigo apresentamos um modelo Kaleckiano que discute as condições nas quais 
crises  externas  podem  surgir  numa  pequena  economia  aberta  em  desenvolvimento, 
completamente integrada aos mercados internacionais de bens e financeiros. Especificamente, 
procuramos entender como as variáveis-chave de um modelo macrodinâmico Kaleckiano, e em 
particular a relação dívida externa/PIB, se comportam quando são simultaneamente válidas a 
paridade do poder de compra e a paridade descoberta de juros. O governo pode escolher entre 
duas políticas: metas de inflação ou metas de taxa de câmbio real. O trabalho procura identificar 
as condições para a emergência endógena de finanças Ponzi no débito externo nos dois cenários 
alternativos de políticas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last three decades and especially from the 1990s the Latin American economies 
have become much more integrated to international trade and financial markets. This integration 
has made it more complicated for the region to foster growth and at the same time reduce the 
impact on the domestic economy of external financial and exchange turbulences. Latin America 
is particularly prone to experience severe external crises, a point which has been traditionally 
stressed by the structuralist tradition
4. The devastating effects of the 1982 debt crisis throughout 
the region (following the Mexican default) and the more recent crises in Mexico (1994), Brazil 
(1999) and Argentine (2002) have confirmed this view. Recently, the external constraint had been 
considerable eased for some Latin American countries
5 in the context of a vigorous expansion of 
the  world  economy  and  of  improving terms of  trade for  several commodities.  But  the  Latin 
American economic history and the beginning of a world crisis whose magnitude is still unknown 
(following the subprime crisis in the USA) suggest that external instability is by no means a 
matter of the past. 
In this paper we present a model which discusses the conditions in which an external 
crisis  may  emerge  in  a  small  developing  economy  immersed  in  the  global  economy.  More 
specifically, we build on the Minskyan tradition of financial crisis to discuss how a country may 
be endogenously driven towards a situation of Ponzi finance in its external debt in a context in 
which exchange and interest rates are arbitrated by the international economy. Minskyan crises 
are  defined  as  situations  in  which  firms  which  have  manageable  debts  endogenously  move 
towards  an  unsustainable  debt  to  capital  relation,  switching  from  hedge  to  speculative  and 
eventually  to  Ponzi  finance,  according  to  the  Minskyan  typology  of  finance  positions.
6  The 
evolution from hedge to Ponzi finance has strong macroeconomic implications as it is related to a 
                                                 
4 See, among others, Prebisch (1950), Furtado (1979), Rodríguez(1980); Ffrench-David and Griffith-Jones (1997), 
ECLAC (2001), Frenkel and Taylor (2006). 
5 The impact of the expansion of the world economy has not been uniform across Latin America. Countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which are well endowed with natural resources, have experienced a positive shock. 
On the other hand, the small Central American countries, whose comparative advantage depends largely on cheap 
labor, have suffered from declining terms of trade and increasing Chinese competition in the US market (ECLAC, 
2008). 
6 Hedge finance means that firms’ profits are high enough to pay for its financial commitments at any point in time. 
Speculative finance means that profits suffice to pay for the interests of the debt, but firms have to reschedule the 
payment of the principal. Ponzi finance, in turn, emerges when firms have to contract new debt to pay for the 
interests, giving rise to increasing financial vulnerability and potential instability (Minsky, 1975;1986)   3 
cyclical pattern in which rapid growth is followed by the collapse of investment and credit and by 
debt deflation (MINSKY, 1986). In the short run there is a considerable loss of employment and 
production; in the long run, this cyclical pattern may destroy capabilities and reduce productivity 
growth, particularly in catching up economies (see Ffrench-David, 1999; Cimoli and Porcile, 
2008).  
There is already a rich literature on models of Minskyan crisis and post-keynesian models 
addressing key problems in monetary policy which is the basis of this paper
7. Our objective is to 
make contributions to this debate by analyzing the conditions for the emergence of Ponzi finance 
in  a  globalized  economy,  defined  as  one  in  which  both  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  and 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) hold. We assume that governments have two policy options 
as regards the setting of the nominal interest rate. One is to adopt a Taylor-rule with a view to 
achieving  a  certain  desired  level  of  inflation  (inflation  target),  while  the  real  exchange  rate 
endogenously adjusts. The other one is to aim at a real exchange rate target, while the equilibrium 
inflation rate is endogenous. We discuss which of these two alternative policies is more likely to 
favor growth and stability.  
 The  paper  is  organized  three  sections  besides  the  introduction  and  the  concluding 
remarks. Section 1 presents the basic Kaleckian equations for the determination of GDP as a 
function of investment decisions. Section 2 discusses the conditions for external equilibrium in 
different policy settings when the economy is fully integrated to the world economy. In addition, 
it  discusses  inflation  target  in  a  context  in  which  there  is  less  integration  with  international 
financial markets.  
 
1. THE BASIC KALECKIAN MODEL WITH EXTERNAL DEBT 
 
1.1  THE SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
 
We  assume  an  open  economy  in  which  there  is  no  fiscal  policy.  The  role  of  the 
government is confined to set the inflation or exchange rate target and the nominal interest rate 
                                                 
7 See for instance Minsky (1975), Taylor and O’Connel (1985), Dymski and Pollin (1994), Foley (2003), Setterfield 
(2004),  Meirelles  and  Lima  (2006),  Lima  and  Meirelles  (2007).  There  are  also several  Post-Keynesian  models 
addressing key problems in monetary policy, as in Hein and Stockhammer (2007), Lavoie and Seccareccia (2004) 
and  Setterfield (2006).   4 
with a view to securing these targets  Taking as a point of departure the basic macroeconomic 
identities (1) and (2), and assuming that workers do not save, we obtain  equation (3). 
 
(1)  BC I C Y + + =  
(2)  P W Y + =  
(3)  P s W C ) 1 ( − + =  
 
Y is GDP, C is aggregate consumption, I is total investment, BC the  current account 
balance, P are profits,  W are  wages and s is the (exogenous) savings  rate.  All variables are 
defined in real terms.  
The investment function is Kaleckian: the rate of growth of the capital stock is a function 
of  the  difference  between  the  expected  profit  rate  (r
e)  and  the real  interest  rate  (ir),  plus  an 
autonomous  component  (g0)  which  can  be  broadly  seen  as  reflecting  the  Keynesian  “animal 
spirit”.  
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e i r h g g
K
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Real net exports are a function of the total capital stock of the economy, the real exchange 
rate (defined as q = ep*/p, where p are domestic prices, p* foreign prices and e the nominal 
exchange rate) and the propensity to import (m)
8: 
 
(5)  K m aq BC ) ( − =  
 
Based on the Fisher equation and making irπ≅ 0, the real interest rate can be written in 
terms of the nominal interest rate (in) and the inflation rate (π): 
 
(6)  π − = n r i i  
 
                                                 
8 For a similar specification, see Basu (1984) .   5 
Equations from (1) to (6) allows for finding the equilibrium profit rate r (where r = P/K) 
and  the  equilibrium  rate  of  capital  accumulation  g  (where  g  =  I/K)  as  functions  of  the  real 
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  Rearranging terms in (7)  and (4) gives: 
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Equation (8) can be rewritten as a Kaleckian IS curve: 
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Equation  (9)  represents  equilibrium  in  the  goods  market,  in  the  sense  that  aggregate 
demand and supply are equal (a dynamic IS curve), as show in Graphs 1.  
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Graphs 1– IS curve – Short-Term Equilibrium 
 
Still,  this  is  a  short  run  equilibrium  that  may  not  be  sustainable  depending  on  the 
dynamics of the external sector and on the inflation rate. It is then necessary to discuss how the 
real exchange rate, the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate vary to produce the long run 
equilibrium and whether this equilibrium is stable or not. This is the topic of the next items. 
 
1.2 THE DEBT TO CAPITAL RATIO  
 
External equilibrium requires not only Balance-of-Payments equilibrium but also the stability 
of the debt to capital ratio of the economy. We assume that the external debt is issued in the 
international market  at  the  nominal international  interest  rate i*  plus  a  risk  premium  R.  The 
perception of risk is formalized as a function of the debt to capital ratio, R = φδ. There is an 
infinite capital supply at the interest rate (i* + R). 
The change in the total nominal debt (in the currency of the Home country) depends on 
net exports and the payment of interests on the accumulated debt
9: 
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q2 > q1   7 
In equation (10) p represents the domestic price level and p* is the international price 
level. Note that  D p p D dt Dp d & & + = ) ( and hence π D D
pdt
Dp d
+ = & ) (
. Therefore the evolution of the 
real external debt D (expressed in units of the borrowing country product) may be written as 
follows: 
 
(10´)  [ ] π − + + − − = q R i D K m aq D ) * ( ) ( &  
 
The real debt to capital stock ratio is δ = D/K. The rate of growth of δ is as follows: 
 
(11) g D − = ˆ ˆ δ .  
 
Dividing equation (10´) by D, and using (11), we get the equation of motion of the real 
external debt to capital ratio (in terms of the Home country product): 
 
(12)  ( ) [ ] g q i aq m − − + + − = π φδ δ δ * &  
 
Recalling that g is a function of in, π and q, then the evolution of δ depends directly and 
indirectly on these three variables. A higher inflation rate reduces the real burden of the external 
debt, while an increase in the real exchange rate heightens it.  
 
1.3 INTERESTS AND EXCHANGE RATES IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY 
 
In a world economy featuring highly liquid financial markets the uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition must hold. According to this condition, the difference between the domestic and 
the international nominal interest rates should equal the expected rate of devaluation (i.e. the 
expected rise in the nominal exchange rate) plus the risk bonus R, as stated in equation (13): 
 
(13)  φδ + + = e i in
) *  
   8 
In turn, domestic and foreign prices are set in the international markets for tradables (we 
will not consider the influence of nontradables in this paper). It is generally accepted that in the 
long run it is valid the principle of purchasing power parity (PPP), which states that the real 
exchange rate fluctuates around a stable equilibrium ( 0 ˆ = q ). The stability of the real exchange 
rate  requires  that  nominal  exchange  devaluations  compensate  for  the  difference  between  the 
domestic  and  international  inflation  rates  (π-π*).  In  effect,  by  log-differentiating  the  real 
exchange rate q = p*e/p, we have:  
 
(14)  π π − + = e q ˆ * ˆ  
 
Using equation (13) in (14) renders:  
 
(15)  ( ) ( ) φδ π π − − + − = * * ˆ i i q n     
 
When  0 ˆ = q  in equation (15) the principle of purchasing power parity and the uncovered 
interest parity condition are both satisfied at the same time. Throughout the paper we will assume 
that φ = 0, which strongly simplifies the analysis 
Last but not least, we need an equation for the inflation rate. We will assume that it 
responds to two variables. From one hand, inflation is related to the real interest rate. A lower ir 
favors  the  expansion  of investment and consumption and  part  of  this pressure on the  goods 
markets goes to prices. On the other hand, inflation also depends on the real exchange rate. The 
latter effect is related to a key dimension in most macroeconomic models, namely the role of the 
distributive conflict in inflation. A depreciation of the real exchange rate implies a rise in the 
price of imported inputs and consumption goods. If the mark-up is constant, more expensive 
inputs would lead to higher prices (“pass-through effect”). Moreover, if some of the imported 
goods are part of the consumption basket of workers, then the latter will demand higher nominal 
wages with a view to avoiding real losses. Both effects fuel inflation. Finally, since there is a 
unique  relation between  nominal  and  real  interest  rates,  we  can  write  the  inflation rate  as  a 
function of the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate, as in equation (16)
10:     
                                                 
10 A similar equation can be found in  Setterfield (2004b, p.41)   9 
 
(16)  n vi uq − = π   
            where :   0 > = u
dq
dπ







We will assume that the developing economy is integrated to the global economy in such 
a way that  0 ˆ = q in equation (15) is always satisfied. This is the meaning given in this paper to the 
expression “fully globalized economy”: it complies with PPP and UIP at any moment. This is a 
strong assumption, but we believe it is an useful representation of small developing economies. 
In this specific case we cannot distinguish long run and short run, since the velocity of adjustment 
towards PPP and UIP is very high. Therefore will be true that: 
 
(17)  π π + − = * * i in   
 
Equation  (17)  is  the  well  known  condition  of  equality  of  between  the  domestic  and 
foreign real interest rates
11. In the following section we include in the analysis the dynamics of 
the nominal interest rate, which is the variable under control of the Central Bank. 
 
2.  INFLATION  TARGET  AND  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  TARGET  IN  A  FULLY 
GLOBALIZED ECONOMY 
 
So  far  we  have  two  differential  equations  (one  related  to  the  evolution  of  the  real 
exchange rate through time (equation 15) and the other the evolution of the debt to capital ratio 
(equation 12)), a function for the inflation rate (equation 16) and a set of given parameters (a, s, 
h, m, g0, π*, i*, u, v, A, B and C). But there is still one more endogenous variable whose behavior 
has not been specified, namely the domestic nominal interest rate. To discuss this variable we 
assume that the government may choose between two types of policy: inflation target and real 
exchange rate target.   
 
                                                 
11 Another way to understand this equation is that under PPP and UIP conditions the maximum that Central Bank can 
really do is to establish the national real interest rate  equal to  the international ones ( i r = ir*).    10 
2.1  INFLATION TARGET 
 
Let us initially assume that the government has an inflation target (π ): the Central Bank 
takes decisions as regards the nominal interest rate according with a simple Taylor rule:  
 




   In the fully globalized small open economy it will be valid equation (17), which we use in 
the Taylor rule (18): 
 
(19)  ( ) ( ) ) ( ] * * ( ) [ * *
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r r n n
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Equations (12) and (19) form a system of differential equations whose equilibrium values, 
given equations (16) and (17), are the following: 
 


























        Using these results in (9) renders: 
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           The Jacobian is as follows: 
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  The trace of the system is  α π + − − g q i*  and the determinant is  ( ) g q i − −π α * . Note 
that if  g q i − −π * is negative (and  higher in absolute value than  α), then the determinant is 
negative as well and we have a saddle point equilibrium. If on the other hand  g q i − −π * is 
positive then the determinant is positive and the system will be unstable. Therefore in both cases 
we do not have a stable equilibrium - except in the very specific case in which the initial values 
lie precisely in the stable branch of the saddle point. As a result, we will see an international 
economy formed by two types of countries – those which are in a virtuous path of growth with an 
increasingly lower debt to capital ratio, and those which moves towards Ponzi finance in the 
external front. In none of the two cases the inflation target would be attained.  
 
2.2 EXCHANGE RATE TARGET 
 
  We will now assume that the government is firmly committed to a fixed real exchange 
rate. A plausible rationale for this target is the government commitment to avoid any loss of 
international competitiveness derived from a fall in the real exchange rate.  As mentioned, China, 
Germany and Brazil are examples of countries which in different periods embraced this type of 
policy. A form by which the government can manage the real exchange rate is using equation 
(15) so as to define the nominal interest rate compatible with the target real exchange rate. By 
using equations (16) and (17), the real exchange rate target can be written as a function of the 
nominal interest rate: 
 









  Once defined the value of  q  (the real exchange rate target), the target nominal interest 
rate   n i  is automatically defined through equation (25). If the real exchange rate is higher than the 
target  ( q q > ),  then  the  nominal  interest  rate  is  higher  than  the  target  ( n n i i > )  and  the   12 
government should reduce the nominal interest rate. The response function of the government can 
be formally represented as follows (with 0 > ξ ): 
 
(26)    [ ] q q
dt
din − − = ξ  
 
  Using equation (25) in (26) gives a new policy rule for the interest rate:  
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  We now have a system of differential equations formed by equation (27) and a slightly 
modified equation for the dynamics of the debt to capital ratio: 
 
(28)    [ ] ) , ( ) , ( * n n i q g i q q i q a m − − + − = π δ δ &  
 
  The Jacobian of this system is as follows: 
 




− − − −
0
) , ( ' * n i q g v g q i
 
 
Note that in this case suffices a negative trace ( ξ π − − − g q i*  < 0) to have a stable 
equilibrium. Since  ξ −  is always negative, we will refer to the term ( g q i − −π * ) of the trace as 
the stability condition (SC), that must be negative to guarantee a stable equilibrium, i.e., SC <0. 
We will look more carefully at the influence of an increase in the real exchange rate target 
on the stability of the system by taking the derivative of the stability condition SC with respect to 
q .  If  the  derivative  is  negative,  an  increase  in  q   reduces  SC  in  which  case  currency 
depreciations favors stability. In effect: 
 
(30)     [ ]
) 1 ( *
) ( *
+ − − =
− − −
C u Ba i
q d
q g q i d ξ π
   13 
 
  If  ) 1 ( * + + < C u Ba i , then a higher real exchange rate makes the system more stable. We 
will assume in this paper that this condition holds. It is interesting to note that q should be higher 
than a critical value for the system to be stable. To find this critical value, we apply equations (9) 
and (16) in the stability condition: 
 
(30)  
u C Ba i
Bm A v C C i
q
n
c ) 1 (
] ) 1 ( [
* + − −
+ − + +
>  
 
          If the government sets the real exchange rate bellow this critical value the system becomes 
unstable. Thus, in a small open economy fully integrated to the international financial markets, 
the real exchange rate policy does matter. A mistake in managing this variable may give rise to a 
cumulative process in indebtedness and instability.   
 
2.3   INFLATION TARGET REGIME WITH REAL EXCHANGE RATE RIGIDITY: A NOT-SO-
FULLY INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
What does happen if the economy is less globalized in the sense that domestic forces 
define the real exchange rate and in addition equation (15) is dismissed (at least in a short term 
horizon)? In this case we have the following 2x2 system of differential equations: 
  
(31)     ( ) g vi q u q i q a m n − + − + − = ~ ~ * ~ δ δ &  
 (32)    ) ~ ( π α − − = n





Note that now in the Taylor rule the real exchange rate is given by a short run constant 
(q ~) different from the long run real exchange rate q  that guarantee the PPP and UIP conditions. 
The Jacobian matrix of the new system is therefore: 
   14 
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Recalling  that  in  equilibrium  n vi q u − = ~ π ,  a  sufficient  condition  for  having  a  stable 
equilibrium is: 
 
(34)    SC =  0 ) , ~ ( ~ * < − − n i q g q i π  
 
SC is the stability  condition. In this case the trace of the Jacobian is  unambiguously 
negative and the determinant is positive. The equilibrium values of in and δ are given by: 
 
(35)   
























And the equilibrium rate of growth is: 
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  The influence of exogenous changes in the parameters of the model on the equilibrium 
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  Table 1. Impact of Parameter Changes on Equilibrium Values 
 
Variable/Parameters  π   q ~ 
i
E  (-)  (+) 
δ
Ε  (-)  (-)* 
g
E  (+)  (+) ** 
                  *    If   m g a i ) ( * + < π  
                   ** If   v Cu Ba >    
 
Graph 2 illustrates the process of adjustment to equilibrium. The isocline  0 = δ & implies 
( ) ( ) g vi q u i m q a n − + − − = ~ ) * ( ~ δ , which is positively sloped (i.e., δ increases with in)
12. Taking 
point x as the initial condition, it can be seen that at this point the nominal interest rate is very 
high, boosting the debt to capital ratio by reducing economic growth. Still, the nominal interest 
rate is falling since the inflation rate is lower than the target inflation rate. Both the fall in the 
interest rate and the increase of inflation (which moves upwards, in the direction of the inflation 
target) reduce the real interest rate, fostering investment and hence capital accumulation. Lower 
interest rates and higher growth lead the economy to a point in which debt to capital ratio begins 
to fall (crossing the dδ/dt = 0 isocline). When this happens, the debt to capital ratio and the 









                                                 
12  The  derivative  ( ) [ ]
2 ~ ) * ( ) ~ ( g vi q u i q a m i n − + − − = δ δ δ & will  be  positive  if  ( )( ) n i g v q a m ´( ~ − − is 
positive. If  ) ´( n i g v > , and if the developing country shows a deficit in the trade balance so that ( ) 0 ~ > − q a m , 
then the isocline of the debt to capital ratio will be upward sloping in the ( )n i , δ  space.     16 
Graph 2. Phase Diagram With Real Exchange Rate Rigidity 
 
 
Another interesting aspect is that there is a critical threshold for the real exchange rate, 
below  which  the  system  becomes  unstable.  If  we  write  the  equilibrium  value  of 
π − − = g q i SC ~ *  as a function of  q ~ and considering equation (37) we find that for having a 
negative SC is necessary that: 
 
(38)    
vaB v i Cu
Bmv c vc v Av
qc − +
+ + + − −
>
*
) ( ~ π
 
 
Values of the real exchange rate higher than  c q ~  assure that equation (34) is negative. This 
value of the equilibrium real exchange rate represents a bifurcation point; below this point the 
dynamics of the system is radically altered. For instance, given  1 π π = , if the real exchange falls 
to values lower than  m q  the system moves from stability to instability (see graph 3; note that the 
angular  coefficient  of  the  π  +  g(q ~)  line  is  higher  than  that  of  the  i*q ~line,  which  implies 











x  17 
 
Graph 3: The Critical Real Exchange Rate for External Stability 
 
   
The influence of the inflation target can be seen by taking the derivative of SC with 
respect toπ , which is negative:  
 















Graph 3 shows that a fall in π  (from  1 π π = to  2 π π = , 2 1 π π < ) shifts the π  + g(q ) line 
to the right (detached line)
13, making necessary a higher real exchange rate to achieve external 
equilibrium (
* ~
c q ). Indeed there is a trade-off between π and q  by which external stability can be 
obtained with a higher rate of inflation and a lower real exchange rate, or with a higher exchange 
rate  and  lower  inflation  rate.  In  effect,  allowing  both  π and  q to  vary  and  taking  the  total 
differential of SC we have: 
 
                                                 
13 It is important to observe that in graph 2 it has been assumed that the intercept of the π  + g(q ~ ) line, which is A -
Bm + C[(1+v/v)] π , is a negative number. Such a result requires that  ( ) π s h g m o + > (see equation 9). This will 
be  more  likely  in  the  case  of  developing  economies  in  which  the  import  propensity  is  very  high  due  to  the 
characteristics of its economic structure, usually less diversified and concentrated in fewer goods.  
1 π +g(q ~) 
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2 π +g(q ~) 
* ~
c q    18 
(40)   
0











  Equation (40) makes explicit the trade-off between inflation target and real exchange rate 
compatible with a constant stability condition. It has interesting implications from the point of 
view of macroeconomic policy. In some countries governments have more capacity to influence 
the inflation target than the real exchange rate. The latter depends by large on structural variables 
related  to  international  competitiveness  or  on  the  institutional  conditions  organizing  wage 
bargaining in the labor market, which are less flexible. In an economy in which unions are very 
strong and set a low ceiling for the real exchange rate, or whose international competitiveness is 
weak, stability will require a higher inflation rate (within the limits discussed above). Inversely, if 
in an economy in which unions are concerned with international competitiveness (and hence with 
the employment rate), or unions are very weak and the government has more degrees of freedom 
to define the real exchange rate, then the economy will be able to achieve external stability with 
lower rates of inflation in equilibrium.  
A more complicated puzzle emerges when both unions and the Central Bank are hard-
headed and move forward independently with their own agendas. In this case the ensuing result 
could be a negative sum game leading to Ponzi finance in the external sector. Such a case may 
happen when unions constraint the real exchange rate to remain at a lower value than  m q  while 
the Central Bank will insists on keeping inflation at very low levels. The combination of these 
two forces reduces capital accumulation, thereby increasing the relative external debt burden, 
which at the end of the day becomes unsustainable.     
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we presented a simple Kaleckian-Mynskian model with a view to identifying 
the conditions leading to external instability in a small open developing economy. We made a 
heroic assumption, which is the validity at any moment of PPP and UIP: from this perspective the 
exercise  is  to  some  extent  unrealistic.  Still,  this  is  a  useful  assumption  in  the  case  of  small 
developing economy fully integrated to the world financial and goods markets. Some interesting 
results emerge from the model which are summarized as follows.   19 
First, an inflation target policy would not be efficient under PPI and UIP. The reason is 
that the government cannot control inflation when the increase in the nominal interest rate leads 
to increases in the real exchange rate, which in turn feed inflation back. At the same time, the 
debt to capital ratio tends to move away from equilibrium.  
Secondly,  a  real  exchange  rate  target  is  efficient  to  avoid  Ponzi  finance,  but  the 
government cannot in this case define the rate of inflation. External stability is obtained when SC 
= 0 * < − − π g q i   ,  i.e.,  when  the  country  pays  abroad  in  terms  of  real  interest  rates  (the 
term π − q i* ) is less than the rate of economic growth (which reduces the debt to capital ratio).  
The paper discusses in which cases this will be true and highlights the risks of setting a too low 
target  real  exchange  rate: if  the  country  errs  and sets  the  chosen  q  at a  very  low  level,  the 
economy becomes unstable. 
Finally, it is discussed the case in which the economy is less globalized and PPP and UIP 
are (at least temporarily) suspended. In this case the government could choose (and effectively 
achieve) an inflation target compatible with external stability provided that q is higher than the 
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